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Abstract 
The paper empirically investigates the determinants of foreign currency borrowing by 
the private sector in the new member states of the European Union. We find that striking 
differences in patterns of foreign currency borrowing between countries are explained by 
the extent to which domestic banks finance credit expansion from abroad, the level of 
deposit dollarization, and the interest rate differential. Joining the EU appears to have 
played an important role, by providing direct access to foreign funding, offering hedging 
opportunities through greater trade openness, lending credibility to exchange rate re-
gimes, and raising expectations of imminent euro adoption. The empirical evidence sug-
gests that regulatory policies to slow foreign currency borrowing have had only limited 
success. 
1. Introduction 
Private sector borrowing in foreign currencies has become a familiar feature 
of the catching-up process in Central and Eastern Europe. This “dollarization” – in 
fact a “euroization” or “swissfrancization” – process,
1 which appears closely linked to 
the rapid growth of private sector credit, has recently come into focus with the sud-
den shifts of exchange rates in many countries in the region, raising concerns about 
borrowers’ ability to service foreign currency loans. A full understanding of what has 
been driving such borrowing and what explains striking differences between coun-
tries in the region is still elusive. While there is agreement that the convergence- 
-related demand for capital, largely satisfied by foreign parent banks, has played 
a key role, it is not fully clear how this interacts with a number of other factors such 
as individual countries’ monetary policy, the effect of EU and ERM2 membership, 
and regulatory policies. Only very recently has there been research examining these 
issues in the new member states of the EU (NMS).  
This paper examines the drivers of foreign currency borrowing during the run- 
-up to euro adoption using a multivariate approach. Specifically, we expand recent 
work by Basso, Calvo-Gonzales and Jurgilas (2007) and Brzoza-Brzezina, Chmie- 
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Ajai Chopra, Peter Backé, Zoltan Walko, Gavin Gray, Sònia Muñoz, Bikas Joshi, Albert Jaeger, Gustavo
Canavire, Andrzej Raczko, Cezary Wójcik, and participants at a research seminar at the National Bank of 
Poland. The authors would also like to thank Aleš Bulíř and an anonymous referee for their helpful com-
ments and suggestions, and Agata Kariozen for excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are ours. 
1 Although somewhat of a misnomer, in line with the literature we use the term “dollarization” to describe 
the denomination or indexation of loans and deposits in currencies other than the domestic legal tender. 
In the region, the euro is the most commonly used foreign currency, but Swiss franc-denominated loans 
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lewski, and Niedźwiedzińska (2007) by using a  new dataset and some additional 
policy-related variables. Our work also relates to the analysis by Luca and Petrova 
(2008) discussing the role of regulations. The paper does not examine credit growth 
in the NMS per se – a phenomenon that has been widely researched in recent years
2 – 
but rather examines the change in the composition of private sector credit from do-
mestic to foreign currency.  
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present some stylized facts that 
highlight recent trends and differences among countries. Second, we review some 
of the commonly offered hypotheses for foreign currency borrowing in the region. 
Third, we present regression results from a model that includes a variety of variables 
and draws on a set of panel data for the NMS. Finally, we offer some tentative con-
clusions. 
2. Stylized Facts 
Rapid credit growth and a growing share of loans in foreign currency have be-
come a hallmark of the convergence process in many NMS. In the region, the ratio 
of the private sector’s credit from banks to GDP has increased steeply over the last 
decade, with the share of loans denominated in or indexed to foreign currency in-
creasing from 4 to 15 percent
3 (Figure 1). This trend appears to have accelerated over 
the last few years following the countries’ accession to the European Union. While 
familiar in other emerging market regions, notably Latin America, liability dollari-
zation seems particularly strong in the NMS (Figure 2).  
The dollarization process has been asymmetric between loans and deposits. 
While foreign currency borrowing has expanded in many countries, foreign currency 
deposits have remained broadly stable across the region.
4 In Figure 3 this can be seen 
by a shift of the gravity of financial dollarization away from the 45-degree line, in-
dicating a growing exposure of private sector balance sheets to currency risk. This 
trend has potentially significant implications for financial stability.  
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Note: Country sample excl. Slovenia. 
Source: National authorities, Eurostat, and authors' calculations. 
2 See, for example, Cottarelli, Dell’Ariccia, and Vladkova-Hollar (2003); Kiss, Nagy, and Vonnak (2006); 
Égert, Backé, and Žumer (2006); Backé and Wójcik (2008). 
3 Legal restrictions on foreign currency borrowing were lifted in most countries in the mid-1990s. 
4 This may suggest that demand-side factors are increasingly playing a role in foreign exchange borrowing, 
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There are striking differences between individual NMS. The composition of 
credit to the private sector is highly biased towards foreign currency in two Baltic 
countries – Estonia and Latvia (Group A in Figure 4) – while borrowers in Central 
Europe – the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia (Group B) – prefer domestic 
currency. There is an intermediate group of countries (Group C) where the shares of 
local currency and foreign currency credit have remained roughly equal. Sometimes 
this phenomenon is explained by national characteristics (Czechs are supposed- 
ly more “conservative” than Estonians). The purpose of this paper is to investigate 
whether economic incentives and country-specific characteristics underlie these 
stereotypes. 
3. Reasons for Foreign Currency Borrowing – Some Hypotheses 
Dollarization is not a new phenomenon. Borrowing in foreign currencies has 
been a common feature in many emerging market countries in Latin America and 
Asia. The “original sin” literature (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999), which devel- 
Figure 2  Emerging Market Countries: Foreign Exchange Borrowing
(2005, as % of total loans to the private sector) 








Note: Regional figures are calculated as medians. 
Source: Tamirisa and others, 2007, pp. 30, national authorities, and authors' calculations. 
 
Figure 3  Financial Dollarization in the NMS  
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oped following the  financial crises of the  late 1990s and originally focused on 
sovereign borrowing, attributed dollarization mostly to a  lack of monetary policy 
credibility. But borrowing in foreign currencies has also been popular in the private 
sector and in some industrial countries in Europe, such as Italy and the  Nordic 
countries in the early 1990s (Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu, 1998). The fact that dollari-
zation led to painful balance sheet effects following sudden exchange rate de-
preciation has contributed to the view that it constitutes a vulnerability.  
Overall credit growth and borrowing in foreign currencies are closely related. 
During transition, consumption smoothing is an important channel for credit expan-
sion (Backé and Wójcik, 2008). Figure 5 illustrates that foreign currency borrowing 
has contributed to much of the overall credit growth, especially in countries where 
the  private sector’s indebtedness has increased very rapidly in recent years. One 
reason for this may be that access to foreign currency loans, usually at lower rates 
than for domestic currency loans, not only affects the choice of currencies, but also 
the real interest rate as perceived by borrowers. When making a decision to borrow, 
they will often use expected domestic inflation or wage growth to deflate the nominal 
foreign currency interest rate, especially if they consider exchange rate risk to be low. 
This can yield highly negative real interest rates, thus greatly increasing the over- 
all demand for credit, given that inflation and wage growth tend to be higher in 
the catching-up economies. Since this paper is concerned with the currency compo-
sition of borrowing rather than overall credit growth, we will not pursue this linkage 
further. 
The impact of deposit dollarization on liability dollarization is well docu-
mented in the  literature,
5 suggesting that domestic banks seek currency-matched 
portfolios. In a country where domestic banks are facing highly dollarized deposits, 
they are more likely to lend in foreign currency.  
Figure 4  Local Currency vs Foreign Currency Credit-to-GDP Ratio (in %, 2007) 




























































Source: National authorities and authors' calculations.
5 See for example Calvo (2002), Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003), Barajas and Morales (2003), and Luca and
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The availability of foreign funds fueling the credit expansion in the NMS may 
also influence the currency composition of credit. As credit expands beyond the level 
of domestically available resources, banks attract capital from abroad. This is often 
done through existing financial links to parent banks residing in the EU. Since do-
mestic bank regulations often restrict open currency positions, banks pass foreign- 
-funded loans to their customers in foreign currency. This also allows them to 
transfer currency risk directly to borrowers (however, they still bear the credit risk). 
Apart from Slovenia, foreign-owned banks clearly dominate the domestic banking 
sectors in the  NMS and their presence has strengthened further during the  last 
decade.  Figure 6 shows that countries experiencing a  strong increase in the  loan- 
-to-deposit ratio, driven by credit expansion (e.g., the Baltics), are also those bor-
Figure 5  Real Credit Growth to the Private Sector (in %)
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Figure 6  Loan-to-Deposit Ratio in the NMS 
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rowing in a  foreign currency (from Figure 4 above). Basso, Calvo-Gonzales, and 
Jurgilas (2007) develop a theoretical and empirical model that shows how the pres-
ence of foreign banks in the NMS increases liability dollarization. 
Interest rate differentials between local and foreign currency are believed to 
drive the  choice between borrowing in domestic versus foreign currency. Several 
recent empirical studies examining foreign currency borrowing in the NMS (Basso, 
Calvo-Gonzales, and Jurgilas, 2007; Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin, 2008) assume that 
uncovered interest rate parity does not necessarily hold and use nominal interest rate 
differences to explain dollarization. The significance of interest rate differentials de-
pends on the credibility of the underlying currency regime and expectations regard-
ing exchange rate movements and inflation differentials. In a country with a highly 
credible peg, an  only small interest rate differential can induce a  shift in lending 
patterns, while in a flexible exchange rate regime a larger differential may be neces-
sary to induce a  similar shift. The  rationale behind this is developed by Jeanne 
(2003), who built a theoretical model describing the  determinants of liability dol-
larization from the perspective of borrowers.  
At first glance, a country’s currency regime appears to play a role as well. 
Barajas and Morales (2003), using a panel on Latin American economies, show that 
central bank policy aimed at minimizing exchange rate variability leads to increas-
ing dollarization of liabilities. Backé and Wójcik (2008) suggest that perceived ex-
change rate risk is smaller in countries with exchange rate pegs, especially currency 
board regimes. This hypothesis seems to be confirmed by Figure 4 above: borrowers 
in countries with de facto rigid exchange rate regimes (Group A) are more willing 
to take on foreign exchange risk than those with flexible exchange rate regimes 
(Group B). But the figure also highlights that the explanation cannot lie in the cur-
rency regime alone, as both Lithuania and Bulgaria have operated currency boards 
for many years, but have a much lower share of credit denominated in foreign cur-
rency. Moreover, a blunt classification into pegged and non-pegged exchange rate 
regimes is not warranted because in several cases (Latvia in 2005, Lithuania in 2002) 
the anchor currency was changed and in some other countries (Croatia, Hungary, 
Romania, and Slovenia) the  exchange rate has been a  de facto consideration in 
monetary policy making. When determining whether borrowers assess currency risk 
based on the expected stability of the exchange rate it would therefore seem useful  
to look at its actual past variability.  
Imminent euro adoption is expected to be a factor in financial dollarization, 
as suggested, for example, by Levy Yeyati (2006). One would expect borrowers to 
increase their borrowing in (cheaper) foreign currencies if they think that curren- 
cy risk will soon disappear. Foreign exchange borrowing did initially accelerate in 
the Baltics when they entered ERM2 – the “antechamber to the euro” – soon after 
joining the EU. In Slovenia the share of foreign currency loans to the private sector 
rapidly expanded during its successful run-up to the eurozone and a similar trend  
was observed earlier in Austria – although this may also have been related to the lib-
eralization of rules regarding foreign currency borrowing at the time. While the evi-
dence is therefore mixed, events like EU membership and ERM 2 participation are 
usually thought to have some positive influence on the  dollarization of credit in 
the NMS.  222                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3 
Finally, a country’s economic policies surely have a bearing on foreign cur-
rency borrowing. The most obvious channel is through monetary policy, which will 
directly affect the interest rate differential discussed above, as well as the volatility 
of the exchange rate. Taxes and subsidies can also influence borrowing behavior; 
for example, the tightening of the eligibility criteria for housing subsidies in Hungary 
in 2004 is believed to have induced consumers to switch to cheap foreign currency 
loans (Bokor and Pellenyi, 2005). Conversely, recognizing the risks associated with 
foreign currency loans, financial supervisors throughout the  region have recently 
taken various regulatory measures to slow down such borrowing. An  interesting 
question, examined below, is whether these actions have had the intended effect. 
4. Empirical Estimation 
The various hypotheses laid out above can be examined in a panel regression 
model (see equation below). For the dependent variable we use the ratio of loans 
denominated in (and indexed to) foreign currency to total domestic bank loans to 
the non-financial private sector. An alternative specification of the dependent vari-
able also includes the private sector’s direct borrowing from abroad, all of which is 
assumed to be in foreign currency.
6 Our preferred model contains the following key 
independent variables: 
 – the ratio of foreign currency deposits to total deposits, 
 – banks’ net foreign assets, 
 – the severity of regulatory measures aimed at discouraging foreign currency 
borrowing, 
 – the difference between local and foreign nominal interest rates, and 
 – exchange rate volatility. 
Consequently, the model can be written as follows: 
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i u X ervolat irdiff restrict banknfa fxdep fxloans . , , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , + + + + + + + = β β β β β α  
with the first five independent variables as described above and a vector Xi,t, con-
sisting of additional variables that were also tested but not included in our preferred 
model (e.g., the asset share of foreign banks, trade openness, and dummies for ERM2 
and EU membership). The exact specification and empirical validity of all the vari-
ables are discussed below. 
The regression draws on quarterly data for the NMS. The sample of countries 
contains the new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe that had not 
adopted the  euro by end-2007 – the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia (which joined the EU in May 2004),
7 Bulgaria and 
Romania (which joined in January 2007), as well as Croatia (an EU candidate since 
2004). Hence, the  panel comprises 10  countries and quarterly data for the  period 
1999–2007. Data for loans and deposits in domestic and foreign currencies were de- 
6 These loans are often granted to subsidiaries of foreign corporates operating in the NMS from banks that 
also provide financial services to their parent companies in the home country. 
7 Slovenia was excluded because the available time series of data were much shorter than in the other 
countries. Data for Macedonia, another EU candidate country, were not compatible with those used for
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rived from national sources, while most other data used for the independent variables 
were collected from Eurostat, IMF, EBRD and BIS databases. The index of policies 
to influence foreign exchange borrowing was constructed using information from 
IMF staff reports and a questionnaire among country desks. Summary statistics and 
a correlation analysis are shown in the Appendix. 
The preferred model specification is estimated by panel regression with coun-
try random effects
8 and appears robust (Table 1, column C). The relatively high cor-
relation between our dependent variable and banks’ net foreign assets suggested 
possible endogeneity problems. Due to a lack of efficient instrumental variables we 
ran our baseline model including various lags of banks’ net foreign assets (up to 
3 lags) to test for signs of endogeneity. Our baseline results were not affected. 
As expected, the  ratio of foreign exchange deposits is highly significant. 
Moreover, banks’ net foreign assets
9 are also highly significant and have the  ex-
pected sign. This suggests that as countries during convergence draw on capital in-
flows to fund domestic borrowing for consumption smoothing purposes, they tend 
to rely relatively more on foreign currency loans. Unlike Basso, Calvo-Gonzales, and 
Jurgilas (2007), we find that it is irrelevant whether such foreign funding is chan-
Table 1  Estimation Results
Dependent variable: Ratio of FX loans to total loans to private sector 
   OLS pooled  FE model  RE model  RE model  RE model 
   A  B  C  C.1  D 






  0.024  0.219  0.076  0.074  0.071 






  0.065  0.144  0.049  0.049  0.048 
Interest rate differential  0.131
***  0.042  0.041
**    0.108
*** 
  0.029  0.050  0.020    0.020 
Inflation differential        0.002
***   
        0.000   
FX restriction index   -4.653
***  -1.131  -1.119
**  -1.197
**  0.509 
  0.640  1.436  0.483  0.477  0.442 
Exchange rate volatility  -1.621
**  -0.232  -0.251  -0.253  -0.029 
  0.671  0.346  0.291  0.288  0.270 
Adj. R sq.  0.74  0.70  0.70  0.71  0.66 
Observations  324  324  324  326  324 
Note: *; **; *** refers to significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. All models include a constant term 
and robust standard errors are shown. 
Source: Authors' calculations.
8 A set of models is shown in Table 1. This includes pooled OLS regression and panel regressions with
fixed and random country effects. The panel regression with random-country effects is our baseline model. 
The relevance of random country effects was confirmed by performing the Hausman test.  
9 Alternatively, we run our baseline model with the loan-to-deposit ratio instead of banks’ net foreign as-
sets, as these two variables are strongly correlated and allow us to control for credit expansion financed by
foreign capital inflows and channeled through the domestic banking sector. Nevertheless, we decided to
use the latter variable in our baseline model based on the better overall fit of the model.  224                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3 
neled through domestic banks borrowing abroad (e.g., through syndicated loans) or 
foreign-owned banks drawing on credit lines from their parent banks. In our model, 
the share of foreign banks in total assets is not significant.  
The interest rate differential is another important determinant of foreign 
currency borrowing. This variable
10 has the expected positive sign and is highly sig-
nificant. In line with both the theoretical and the empirical literature, a higher interest 
rate differential leads to higher dollarization of liabilities in a  country. Monetary 
stability is a significant but not a very important factor in borrowing decisions, as 
can  be seen by using the  inflation differential vis-à-vis the euro  area  in  Table 1, 
column C.1 as a proxy. 
The effect of past exchange rate volatility on dollarization is ambiguous in 
our model. The panel regression found that past exchange rate volatility does not ap-
pear to play much of a role when correcting for other factors: while the coefficient 
has the expected sign, it is not statistically significant.
11 This contrasts with empirical 
findings from other regions (e.g., Kamil, 2009, for Latin American corporates, as 
well as Barajas and Morales, 2003), which suggest the opposite. An economic ex-
planation of why the NMS are different may be that EU membership – at least until 
the beginning of the financial crisis (the period covered by our data set) – increased 
economic agents’ confidence in the stability of the exchange rate, making them more 
willing to assume currency risk. Moreover, nominal exchange rates have generally 
been appreciating in countries with flexible currency regimes, making borrowing in 
foreign currencies even more attractive – although this proves not to be a decisive 
factor in our model.
12  
Joining the European Union does not have any discernible direct effect on 
foreign currency borrowing. The dummy variable for EU membership has the ex-
pected sign and is statistically significant. However, it lowers the overall fit of 
the model. The reason may be that the associated confidence effects come into play 
before the actual entry date and at different times in different countries, something 
that is difficult to measure. Another way to test both the expected time until euro 
adoption and expectations about exchange rate stability is participation in the Ex-
change Rate Mechanism (ERM2), which ex ante limits exchange rate movements, 
especially the scope for large depreciations. This dummy variable is not statistically 
significant. The  explanatory power of ERM2 may be affected by the  fact that 
the majority of countries participating in it (i.e., the Baltics) joined with an already 
rigid exchange rate regime.  
Hedging opportunities in the  private sector increase dollarization, at least 
in the corporate sector. Revenues from abroad make it easier for corporates to hedge 
10 Because of data limitations, we use the 3-month money market rate differential of the local currency vis-
-à-vis the euro (i – i*). While this ignores the fact that in some countries foreign currency loans are often
denominated in Swiss franc, these interest rates are highly correlated with euro interest rates (factor 0.96).
Using this approximation also implies that the risk premium and fees for the median borrower in a country 
are constant at one point in time for both local currency loans and foreign currency loans. Anecdotal
evidence confirms that, at least until recently, banks did not include the currency risk in their calculations.  
11 Modeling the exchange rate impact by using not actual past volatility but a simple dummy that dis-
tinguishes between fixed and flexible regimes yields a non-significant coefficient. 
12 Brzoza-Brzezina, Chmielewski, and Niedźwiedzińska (2007) find that the level of exchange rates mat-
ters: borrowers take out foreign exchange loans when the domestic currency is strengthening. Using
the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate we were not able to verify this in our model. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3                                             225 
 
their foreign currency exposure. We tested various measures of openness – exports 
plus imports, exports of goods and non-factor services – which all have the correct 
positive sign. However, their statistical significance varies across different speci-
fications. As the majority of countries from our sample are very open economies, we 
exclude this variable from our baseline model.  
Finally, regulatory policies aimed at reducing foreign currency borrowing 
may have only a limited effect. Based on the information gathered from IMF Staff 
Reports, we construct an  index measuring the  severity of such measures, ranging 
from stepped-up monitoring (least restrictive) to quantitative limits on the foreign 
currency lending of banks
13 (most restrictive).
14 To guard against reverse causality, 
the model uses various lags for this variable. Policies against foreign currency lend-
ing have the expected sign in the specification that uses only borrowing from do-
mestic banks as the dependent variable (Table 1, column C), but turns statistically 
insignificant when direct borrowing from abroad is included (Table 1, column D). 
This illustrates that various measures imposed by domestic financial supervisors 
indeed affect the flow of foreign currency credit through the domestic banking sys-
tem, but may also divert borrowing to non-resident financial institutions. With no 
capital account restrictions in the NMS, such policies may therefore be largely in-
effective.  
Table 2  Testing the Robustness of the Estimation Results
Dependent variable: Ratio of FX loans to total loans to private sector 
   RE model  RE w/ time dum. RE model 
   C  C.I  C.II 




   0.076  0.084  0.078 




   0.049  0.054  0.069 
Interest rate differential  0.041
**  0.092
***  0.036 
   0.020  0.022  0.024 




   0.483  0.482  0.463 
Exchange rate volatility  -0.251  -0.092  -0.280 
   0.291  0.304  0.293 
Adj. R sq.  0.70  0.67  0.84 
Observations  324  324  258 
Note: *; **; *** refers to significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. All models include a constant term 
and robust standard errors are shown. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
13 Such a measure was in place in the past in Romania.  
14 Exclusively the measures that strictly targeted foreign exchange borrowing (as opposed to overall credit
growth) were considered. The index is defined as:  ,, it it Index policy =∑ . The values associated with the re-
spective policies are as follows: monitoring of FX risk –0.2, disclosure of FX risk to customers –0.4, 
tightening of eligibility criteria for FX borrowing –0.6, higher FX risk weights/provisioning/reserve re-
quirement –0.8, and introduction of ceilings on FX exposure –1.0.  226                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 3 
Our model tracks well actual developments in most countries. In order to test 
the  robustness of the  results, we included time dummies to control for common 
shocks to countries (Table 2, column C.I) and also restricted our sample by excluding 
outliers (Estonia, Latvia; Table 2, column C.II). In the latter specification the coef-
ficients of the ratio of FX deposits and banks’ net foreign assets increased markedly, 
while the interest rate differential variable turned insignificant.
15 The remaining re-
sults were unaffected.  
5. Conclusions  
We found that the growing dollarization of liabilities in the NMS can be ex-
plained primarily by the extent to which domestic banks finance credit expansion 
from abroad, the level of deposit dollarization, and the interest rate differential. 
A number of other measurable variables, such as regulatory policies and trade open-
ness, have a bearing on foreign currency borrowing by the private sector. Our model, 
which draws on panel data for NMS from Central and Eastern Europe plus Croatia 
and covers the period 1999–2007, is robust to alternative specifications.  
The central point from this analysis is that membership in the European Union 
boosts foreign currency borrowing through various indirect channels. First, by fully 
liberalizing the capital account, EU membership offers borrowers increased access to 
foreign funding, both through domestic banks affiliated with foreign parents and 
directly from abroad. Second, by increasing trade openness, it provides hedging op-
portunities, especially for the corporate sector. Finally, EU membership appears to 
have boosted the private sector’s confidence in exchange rate stability and imminent 
euro adoption. As a result, borrowers appear to have considered devaluation a low- 
-probability event and therefore neglected the  exchange rate risk associated with 
borrowing in foreign currency. This has been reinforced by interest rate differentials. 
For the same reasons, commercial banks appear to have also been more willing to 
lend in foreign currency. The empirical analysis shows that regulatory measures aimed 
at slowing foreign currency borrowing are largely ineffective because access to 
foreign financing directly from abroad makes it easy to circumvent them. Given that 
under EU law capital account restrictions are not an option to close this loophole, any 
measures to address foreign currency exposures will therefore require close coopera-
tion between supervisors in home and host countries. 
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